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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT J. CASTAGNO and 




MELVIN CHURCH and ESTHER 
C. CHURCH, his wife, 
Defendant-Appellants, 
Case No. 14412 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS CHURCH 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for Breach of Contract arising out 
of a Uniform Real Estate Contract which included the sale— 
purchase of water rights with Defendants-Appellants as the 
sellers, and Plaintiffs-Respondents as buyers. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiffs, on their cause of action, Defendants 
appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment as to Plaintiffs' 
cause of action, and entry of judgment in their favor as a matter of 
equity, or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants had aquired a water right known as "the 
Buzianis right" (T. 40, Lines 18-24), which they sought to 
transfer to a well upon the subject property prior to the 
execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which Plaintiffs 
and Defendants subsequently executed. However, Defendants were 
prevented from transferring the point of diversion to the well 
because the right was in one water district and the well was 
in another. (T. 39, Lines 30 - 40, Line 10). 
Thereafter, both parties had discussion with Rex Larson, 
the area engineer of the State Engineer's Office, Water Rights 
Division, about another right they could possibly transfer to 
the subject well. (T. 44, Lines 6 - 12 & T. 40, Lines 25-30). 
The parties thereafter obtained an assignment of this right. 
(The Castagno or Bernard Castagno right), (T. 56, Lines 5-6, 
20-30, & T. 57, Lines 1-10). Bernard Castagno was the father 
of Plaintiff, Albert Castagno. His mother assigned the right, 
which represented five second feet of water to the Plaintiff, 
Albert Castagno, who assigned three second feet thereof to the 
Defendant, Melvin Church. These assignment were made in August 
of 1973. (T. 90, Lines 8-30 & T. 91, Lines 1-12). Thereafter, 
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in December, 197 3, the parties executed the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, out of which the controversy herein arises. (Ex, 1-P, 
T. 5, Lines 4-8) . The contract was drafted by the Plaintiffs' 
attorney. (T. 84, Lines 8-12). 
Attached to the contract was a sheet entitled, "Exhibit 
A", which Plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Watson, indicated at trial 
was prepared by him. (T. 92, Lines 1-19). Paragraph three of 
Exhibit A provided as follows: 
"Upon payment in full of said contract price, 
Sellers will convey by Warranty Deed the 
final easterly contiguous Ten (10) acres of 
said property, together with all water rights 
to Well already drilled upon said property, 
Well Certificate # _[sic], including Two 
[sic] second feet of water, one second foot of 
which Buyer will furnish..." 
After the execution of the contract, Plaintiffs entered 
into possession of the premises and commenced pumping the sub-
ject well to irrigate a crop of barley. 
Shortly after having so commenced, however, Mr. Larson 
ordered the well to be shut off, (T. 38, Lines 14-18), because 
there was a "question" about the title to the water right. (T.55, 
Lines 6-7). 
Defendants then sought a hearing through the Division 
of Water Rights to clear the protests to the water rights, 
(T. 55, Lines 28-30), and on the day the hearing was scheduled, 
Defendant, Melvin Church went to the Plaintiffs' attorney's office 
to assist in preparing for the hearing. (T. 98, Lines 5-6, 14-23), 
but the hearing was continued and not held. (T. 58, Lines 1-16? 
T. 97, Lines 16-21? T. 98, Lines 24-29 & T. 99, Lines 1-13); 
-3-
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nor has the hearing since been held to approve or deny the 
transfer to the subject well, (T. 58, Lines 14-21); although, 
Rex Larson admitted that the hearing should have been set 
automatically by the State Engineer, and not at the request 
of the parties, (T. 61, Lines 7-11). 
Consequently, although Defendants have segregated to 
the subject well one second foot of the three second feet 
assigned to them by the Plaintiffs, (T. 90, Lines 8-16 & 30; 
T. 91, Lines 1-12), Defendants have not been able to comply 
with their agreement. And, according to Rex Larson, the area 
engineer, there are no other water rights for sale in the area; 
the area is closed to new appropriations. (T. 46, Lines 5-30; 
T. 47, Lines 1-4). 
Therefore, when Plaintiffs- tendered full payment and 
demanded one second foot of water or a reduction in the price 
of the land, Defendants were frustrated by events beyond their 
control, or the foreseeability of the parties when the contract 
was executed, and thereby unable to perform. The Court erred 




THE CONTRACT IS AMBIGOUS AS TO THE 
WATER RIGHTS INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED. 
. Paragraph two of the Contract (Ex. 1-P), and paragraph 
three of the attachment thereto, labled "Exhibit A ", contain 
provisions for the conveyance by the sellers to the buyers of 
- A -
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a second foot of water. Yet in both instances, a blank is 
left in the typewritten paragraph for the identifying number 
of the "certificate" by which the second foot of water is to 
be identified. 
Even a cursory reading of paragraph three of the attach-
ment would indicate that the parties had in mind a distinct and 
particular water right when the contract was executed. 
The sentence in question reads in part as follows, (Ex. 
1-P) : 
"...Sellers will convey...all water rights 
to Well already drilled upon said property." 
[Emphasis added.] 
The sentence says, in part, that sellers are to convey 
the water rights which have been assigned or are permitted by 
law to be diverted from the well. It is conceded that since 
paragraph four of the attachment provides that the Plaintiffs 
are to have the exclusive use of the well and two second feet 
of water to be diverted therefrom during the life of the con-
tract, it would appear that the parties understood that water 
was legally obtainable from the well, as opposed to the quit-
claim type of situation wherein the seller only conveys what 
right he may possess, if any. The sentence then proceeds to 
identify the water rights: 
"...Certificate # , including 
Two (2) second feet of water,..." 
Hence, the contract clearly demonstrates that the parties 
intended to convey a specific water right; which is not identi-
fied by number in either paragraph, the space for the identify-
ing number being left blank. 
- R _ . ' • • • 
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Plaintiffs contended at the trial that the reference was 
not to a specific water right, however, but to the well drilling 
permit under which the well was drilled, (T\ 20, Lines 5-18). 
Yet, it is undisputed that the contract, including the sentence 
in question, was drafted by Plaintiffs through their attorney, 
Mr. Watson; (T.92, Lines 1-19; T. 84, Lines 8-10), the Plaintiffs' 
attorney indicated that he had to redraft the attachment so that 
it would correctly express his clients1 wishes. (T. 92, Lines 
16-19) : 
"MR. WATSON: I prepared that exhibit and I had it 
prepared wrong; and on first viewing, we had to prepare it, 
and it was changed accordingly." 
This Court has previously ruled that when more than one 
meaning can be assigned to a term in a contract, that the term 
must be interpreted against the party who chose the term. In 
the case of Handley v. Mutual L. Ins. Co.3 106 Utah 184, 147 
P.2d 319, 322, 152, ALR 1278 (1944) this court said: 
"It is to be granted that a contract in 
case of ambiguity must be construed 
against the party who drew it..." 
Again, in the decision of Byrant v. Deseret News Publish-
ing Co., 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951): 
"Plaintiff also invokes the rule of 
interpretation that doubtful, ambiguous 
terms in a contract should be interpreted 
against the party who has chosen the terms, 
[citation omitted]. We agree that those 
rules of construction should be considered 
in determining what is a reasonable and 
fair interpretation of the intention of 
the parties." c.f. 2 Restatement Contracts, 
§ 236(d); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts, § 275. 
If Plaintiffs, through their attorney, had intended the 
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contract to identify a specific well drilling permit, they . 
would have denominated the "permit" as such, not as a "certi-
ficate18 , the name commonly given to a document identifying 
and specifying a water right obtained by a person. The law 
of interpretation of integrated contracts clearly provides that 
common usage will be applied first to define a contract's terms, 
(2 Restatement Contracts § 230) and Plaintiffs' attorney cer-
tainly would have provided for a "well drilling permit" number 
if such was desired. Furthermore, since only one well was 
extant at the time, (T. 20, Lines 27-30), no useful purpose 
would have been accomplished by referring to that well's permit, 
whereas, the parties certainly would have clarified their in-
tent and made it more incisive by referring to the number of 
the water certificate which was to be transferred to the well. 
As will be seen later, the identity of the particular 
water right was, in fact, very important to the Defendant's case, 
yet the court would not permit testimony on the subject. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO LOOK 
BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE CONTRACT 
TO DETERMINE THE PARTIES' INTENT RE-
GARDING THE WATER RIGHT. 
During the cross-examination of Albert Castagno, the 
purchaser, Defendants attempted to establish that water right 
which the contract, but for the blank space, would have identi-
fied. (T. 22, Lines 4-6): 
-7-
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"QUESTION: Was there any discussion as to where you 
were to acquire your additional water right? 
ANSWER: There was. 
MR. WATSON: Object, and my objection again goes those 
questions are going to parol evidence. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained." 
And, again on recross examination, the Plaintiff was pre-
vented from testifying as to the source of the water right to be 
conveyed with the well. (T. 32, Lines 21-27; T. 33, Lines 2-6): 
" THE COURT: His question, however, is whether you dis-
cussed that? 
ANSWER: Oh yeah, We discussed it, you bet. 
MR. WATSON: I object to that again, Your Honor, that is 
his opinion and Your Honor is going to have to ... 
THE COURT: The objection isn't timely and the answer is 
in; I had to prompt him to get the answer. 
MR. JEPPESEN: QUESTION. What was the essence of your 
conversation regarding the source of the water? 
MR. WATSON: Objection, Your Honor, it's going in viola-
tion of the parol evidence rule. 
THE COURT: Sustained." 
Defendants proffered or solicited testimony on several occasions 
as to the identity of the water certificate as being material to 
their defense, (T. 22-25; T. 32-33; T. 41-44; T. 86; T. 89-90), in spite 
of the fact that the number identifying the water right was left blank, 
thereby leaving an open hole in Plaintiff fs protestations that there was no 
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ambiguity and that Plaintiffs were protected by the parol 
evidence rule. 
In the case of Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 
952, 956 (1953) the court quoted the trial court in concluding 
that an ill drawn and ambiguous exhibit does not relieve the 
court, whether trial court of court of review, of its responsi-
bility, 
"...to ascertain its meaning if that can 
be done under the provision of law respecting 
this type of instrument, [real estate contract] 
In searching for meaning, the court must first 
examine that language used in the instrument 
itself and accord to it the weight and effect 
which the instrument itself may show that the 
parties intended the words to have. If then 
it meaning is still ambiguous or uncertain, 
the Court may consider other contemporaneous 
writings concerning the same subject matter, 
and may, if it is still uncertain, consider 
parol evidence of the parties intention." 
Defendants were not afforded the opportunity of identi-
fying the water right as Mathis provides they should have been 
allowed to do, and as buttressed by the decision of Continental 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 101, 306 P.2d 773 
(1957) . 
The refusal to permit this evidence was clearly in 
error, to which Defendants took exception. (T. 42, Line 3). 
The error is evident when the doctrine of frustration is con-
sidered, especially in light of the testimony with regards to 
the manner in which Defendants performance with regards to the 
water right was frustrated. 
9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT THREE 
THE FACTS INVOKE THE DOCTRINE OF 
FRUSTRATION TO EXCUSE THE DEFENDANTS1 
PERFORMANCE,, 
The general rule of equity is, that when a promisor's 
performance is impossible or highly impracticle because of 
superceding acts or events unforseen by the parties when 
the contract was executed, the performance of the parties will 
be excused, specific performance will not be imposed and the 
parties will be restored to their former estate. 
Hence, in the case of Perry v. Champlain Oil Co-3 Inc., 
99 N.H. 541, 114 A.2d 885, 888, the Plaintiff contracted with 
the Defendant that he would open a specific named gas station 
on the subject premises. Through no fault of the Plaintiff's, 
he lost the right to represent that specific named company 
and his contract performance with the Defendant was therefore 
excused under the doctrine of frustration. 
Likewise, in Midlothian v. Bobbins,, 81 Ill.App.2d 22, 
225 N.E.2d. 651, 656, cert denied. 390 U.S. 948 (1967), the 
Plaintiff contracted to buy water from Defendant. It was sub-
sequently determined that Defendant's supply was totally in-
adequate for Plaintiff's needs, and Plaintiff was excused from 
purchasing water from Defendant. 
A brief review of the facts of this case relating to 
the one second foot of water Defendants agreed to supply 
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demonstrates that in spite of the transfer of the water to 
the subject well, Defendants have been frustrated in their 
performance, because the right to use that water has yet to 
be decided by the State Engineer's Office. 
During redirect examination, Mr. Rex Lawson, area 
engineer for the Grantsville area of Tooele Valley, wherein 
the well and real property herein lies, (T. 35, Ex.l-P) testi-
fied under questioning by Mr. Watson that the Defendant, Melvin 
Church, had applied for the transfer of a second foot of water 
to the subject well from a water right known as the "Buzianis 
right", which change application was denied because the 
"Buzianis right" was for water located in a water shed or 
district other than the one where subject well was located. 
Subsequently, Mr, Church filed another change application 
known as the "Castagno right" or "Bernard Castagno right". 
(T. 48, Lines 3-19 & T. 54, Lines 9-20, 27-30) : 
"MR. WATSON: QUESTION. Mr. Larson, calling your atten-
tion to your testimony about Mr. Church filing application 
No. A-7783 (151881) that was an application to divert one 
second foot of water onto the subject property and that is 
covered by the contract? are you aware now of that application? 
ANSWER: Yes, from the document you have just showed me. 
QUESTION: The documents are you then advised by memory 
or after refreshing do you recall that there was [sic] two 
applications made by Mr. Church? 
ANSWER: Apparently there was, yes. 
QUESTION: One from Louis Buzianis, an application that 
was in the Tooele area, is that right? 
ANSWER: Yes. That's right. I thought you were talking 
about — — 
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QUESTION: And then there was another application by 
Mr. Church to divert a source of water from other sources, 
is that correct? 
ANSWER: Apparently that is. 
THE COURT: So that I'll have this matter in mind 
properly as to what your testimony is; may I just briefly 
summarize what I believe you have told me and see if you agree? 
ANSWER: All right. 
QUESTION: Mr. Larson, As I understand your testimony, 
the so-called first application for change was the one that 
has been called the Buzianis matter? 
ANSWER: Correct. 
QUESTION: And that one was heard and denied by reason 
of the fact that you had to change district and policy of the 
district could not be changed? 
ANSWER: That is correct. 
QUESTION: Now, regarding the so-called second applica-
tion; is that the one that might be called maybe the Castagno 
application? 
ANSWER: Yes." 
Mr. Church subsequently testified on direct examination 
that the second application was filed some four months prior 
to the execution of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(T. 88, Lines 14-17, T.90, Lines 80-16): ' 
"QUESTION: Now, are you speaking of what Mr. Larson 
referred to as the second assignment No. A-7783, or the Bernard 
Castagno assignment? 
-12-
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ANSWER: Yes, 
QUESTION: And when did you acquire the water right? 
ANSWER: Oh, prior to the signing of that agreement, 
QUESTION: What is the date? 
ANSWER: The 20th of August, 1973, was when this 
assignment was signed." 
The Bernard Castagno right was acquired by the Defendants 
from the Plaintiffs3 for the purpose of providing a water right 
that could be diverted from the well. (T. 90, Lines 30; T. 91, 
Lines 1-12): 
"Mr. Jeppesen: Strike that. Would you tell us the pro-
cedure you followed in acquiring the water right which you in-
tened or intend to convey pursuant to the contract? 
ANSWER: Procedure was filing the necessary documents 
that establish the chain of the title from Albert's father 
to his mother, and his mother to him; and from him to me. Now 
along with a segregation application for the seperate one second 
foot and transfer it onto the property that was sold, that was 
established. 
QUESTION: You have segregated one second foot and filed 
that? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
QUESTION: And that is, in fact, the A-7783 application? 
ANSWER: Yes." 
The Bernard Castagno right was brought to the parties' 
attention by Mr. Rex larson, the area engineer. (T. 40, Lines 
25-30; Te 41, Lines 1-4): 
-13-
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"QUESTION: All right. I assume this is the so-called 
Buzianis right and after that right was denied, do you recall 
having a conversation in your office with Mr. Church with re-
gard to possible other sources of water that could be trans-
ferred to the Plaintiff's land? 
ANSWER: Yes, I do. 
QUESTION: And did you mention to him a five second 
right that was in the estate of Bernard Castagno? 
ANSWER: I mentioned this particular right that had 
been filed on by Bernard CAstagno, yes." 
Mr. Larson discussed the right with both of the parties 
on numerous occasions. (T. 44, Lines 6-12): 
"QUESTION: Have you had any conversation with either 
of the parties in this matter concerning the acquisition of 
a water right, or a permit to drill a well and divert water 
to that well on this property? 
ANSWER: Yes, on numerous occasions. 
QUESTION: In fact, you had conversations with both 
parties? 
ANSWER: Yes." 
The change application segregating the Defendants1 one 
second foot of water and changing its point of diversion to 
the subject well was, however, protested by Myron Castagno and 
the Federal Land Bank. (T. 37, Lines 9-17; Ex. P-15, P-16). 
On the date the hearing on the protest was scheduled to be held, 
the Defendant/ Melvin Church/ came to the Courthouse to attend 
the hearing. (T. 97, Lines 16-20). 
"MR. JEPPESEN: QUESTION. Let me ask you this; did 
you, in fact/ go to the hearing assembly itself? 
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ANSWER: No* 
QUESTIONS Why not? 
ANSWER^ Because the phone call was made. 
MR. WATSON: Your Honor, I object« 
THE WITNESS: The hearing was canceled by Mr. Watson. 
THE COURT: The record of any response that was made to 
that question is now stricken and I'll let you answer that 
question, why didn't you go to the hearing? 
ANSWER: I was advised that 
THE COURT: By whom? 
ANSWER: By Eddie Watson." 
According to Mr. Church, (T. 99, Lines 21-23) and Mr. 
Rex Larson, the hearing had not been rescheduled and held as 
of the date of the trial. (T. 58, Lines 14-16). As a conse-
quence, Mr. Larson had to require the Plaintiffs to discontinue 
using the water from the well. (T. 38, Lines 14-18). 
Mr. Larson also indicated the perdicament in which the 
Defendants were placed by this turn of events, there being no 
other water available for diversion from the subject well. (T. 40, 
& 47, Lines 1-4): 
"MR. WATSON: QUESTION. One question, Mr. Larson, is 
it possible to get a water right to this piece of property now, 
the property in question? -
ANSWER: The area is closed to new appropriations of 
water in excess of that required for domestic purposes of one 
family. 
-15-
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QUESTION: Excuse me, 
ANSWER: However, if the applicant could obtain a 
water right by purchase or transfer from one who has an 
approved right, change application could be filed as long 
as that right is in the Grantsville area and it could trans-
ferred by change application to this location. 
QUESTION: And at the present time, Mr. Larson, to 
your personal knowledge, are there presently permitted wells 
which have not been drilled in the Grantsville area that could 
possibly be purchased and transferred to this? 
ANSWER: I am not aware of any approved applications 
that have not been drilled. We have numerous applications 
that have been filed and not yet approved. 
QUESTION: And if those were disapproved, then would that 
open up possibility of water to be obtained? 
ANSWER: Not necessarily. 
QUESTION: Are there, in your mind and with your know-
ledge, purchasable rights in the Grantsville area if the person 
would sell? 
ANSWER: I am not aware of any that are for sale, no. 
QUESTION: But there are those that could be transferred? 
ANSWER: If they could acquire the right, yes. 
QUESTION: Or induce the owner of the right to transfer, 
is that what you mean? 
ANSWER: Yeah." 
Hence, Defendants are without a present means of supply-
ing one second foot of water to the well, and will be until 
the hearing is scheduled and held pursuant to the notice of 
the State Engineer's Office. As Mr. Larson also indicated, the 
hearing will be set, not upon notice or request of one of the 
-16-
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parties, but when it comes up again automatically for hearing 
as set by the department, (T, 61, Lines 7-12): 
"QUESTION: If one particular party asked for a contin-
uance, would you require that party to request the matter be 
reset for hearing or would you automatically reset it for 
hearing? 
ANSWER: It would be automatically reset to the next 
time when we scheduled hearings in the area," 
Consequently, through no fault of the Defendants, the 
application for water which the parties intended to be used 
from the subject property is unavailable for use at the time 
Plaintiffs demand performance, which, it should be noted, is 
some six years prior to the expected date of full payment by 
the seller, (Ex. 1-P), since the purchase was to have been 
paid in annual installments of $2,500 each, and the water right 
and well was to be conveyed only upon final payment. Wherefore, 
the doctrine of frustration should be applied to aid defendants 
herein. 
The doctrine is probably best expressed in the opinion 
of the Idaho Supreme Court in Twin Harbors Lumber Co. v. Carrico* 
92 Idaho 343, 442 P.2d 753, 758-759 (1968): 
"The doctrine of impossibility excusing 
performance of a contractual obligation, 
insofar as relavent in the present setting, 
provides generally that if by express terms 
of a bargain or within the contemplation of 
the bargaining parties the existence of a 
specific thing is essentially necessary for 
the performance of a promise in the bargain, 
a duty to perform the promise...is discharged 
if the thing...subsequently is not in exis-
tence in time of seasonable performance.M 
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! Parsons v. Bristol Vev. Co., 62 Cal.2d 861, 
44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839 (1965); c.f. 
Cannon v. Huhndorf, 67 Wash.2d 778, 409 P.2d 
865 (1966); United States v. Buffalo Coal 
Mining Company, 345 F.2d 517, (on denial of 
petition for rehearing) (9th Cir. 1965); 
Foster v. Atlantic Refingin Co,, 329 F.2d 
485 (5th Cir. 1964); See gen. Annot. Modern 
Status of Rules Regarding Impossibility of 
Performance as Defense in Action for Breach 
of Contract. 84 A.L.R.2d 12, §19, pp 92-102 
(1962); 6 Corbin, Contracts &1339 (1962); 
6 Williston, Contracts && 1948 and 1952-1953 
(rev. ed. 1938); Simpson, Contracts & 182 
(2nd Ed. [Hornbook] 1965)." 
The case of West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Re-
search v. Meyer, 366 F.2d 220, 225, cert, denied 385 U.S. 1010 
(C.A. 9th Cir. 1966) further gives support to the right of the 
Defendants to be excused performance here. Therein, stockholders 
agreed fcy contract to sell their tax exempt institute and to 
enter into a lease-back agreement for the use of the facilities 
of the institute. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service 
declared the arrangement invalid for capitol gains tax purposes, 
which the stockholders showed at trial to be the purpose of 
the arrangement. The court held that "commercial frustration" 
or supervening impossibility of performance applied, and the 
stockholders were relieved of transacting the sale. 
As was shown by the testimony of Mr. Rex Larson, produc-
tion of some other water right in this instance is highly un-
likely as Mr. Larson, the supervising engineer knows of none 
for sale and indicated that the area was closed to new appro-
priations for any purpose but single family culinary use. (T. 
46-47 supra). 
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The fact that the Defendants might be able to acquire 
another right if they were to come up with whatever exceedingly 
unreasonable price, the seller might wish does not take the 
Defendants8 performance out of the doctrine of frustration, 
as the doctrine of frustration is invoked whenever the perfor-
mance of the promisor is highly impractable or unreasonably 
difficult. Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf R. Co. v. Grand Lake Grain 
Co., 434 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1967); Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. 
Ass'n., 518 P.2d 22 (1972); Cherokee Water Diet. v. Colorado 
Springs, 519 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1974); Portland Section of Council 
of Jewish Women v. Sisters of Charity of Providence in Oregon, 
266 Or.448, 513 P.2d 1183 (1973). 
: r CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in all of its findings of 
fact and in the conclusions of law, as far as the same consid-
ered the Plaintiff1 legal or equitable remedies. Nevertheless, 
the court erred in failing to invoke the doctrine of frustration 
so as to excuse Defendants' performance when the failure thereof 
was entirely unforseen by the parties and beyond their power 
to prevent. Had the court permitted testimony as to the parties 
identification of the source of water to be diverted from the 
well, that plus the testimony of Mr. Larson that no other water 
was available for diversion from the well, would have called for 
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the application of the doctrine of frustration and excused the 
Defendants1 performance if not altogether, at least for suffi-
cient time for the cloud on the water right in question to be 
cleared. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants Church, respectfully pray that 
the trial court's judgment against them be reversed, and that 
failing, that they be granted a new trial 
Dated this lj day of March, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ ^ ^ ^ ^ L L , 
Alan K. ^eppl^aen 
T o o e l e / 6 i t y k ) | l 
90 North Maihv*$treet 
Tooele /NTJP^y 84074 
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